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Abstract
What are the implications of the proliferating preferential trade agreements (PTAs) for the liberal trade order? Many scholars
and practitioners see large increases in PTAs as a destabilizing factor that undermines core features of the post-war interna-
tional trade system. By contrast, this paper argues that the accelerated growth of PTAs since the mid-1990s enhances the resi-
lience of the liberal trade order. PTAs increase the ability of the order to accommodate heterogeneous preferences and
distributive conflicts. They represent a continuation of a longer path of liberalization set in motion by the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). This path-dependent development created conditions for a gradual expansion of the membership
and the regulatory scope of the GATT/WTO system, but also heightened levels of preference heterogeneity and distributive
conflicts. By enabling groups of states with homogenous preferences to layer new rules on top of the multilateral GATT/WTO
system, PTAs enable the continuation of the liberalization path. Consequently, PTAs have served as complements rather than
to undermine the WTO.
Policy Implications
• Layering offers a promising way to break gridlock in major international institutions. Especially given high levels of prefer-
ence heterogeneity in a globalized world, decision-makers should realize its potential to put in place workable governance
solutions in the absence of consensus.
• Layering gives rise to or expands regime complexes. Within regime complexes, the key task for practitioners is to invoke
suitable governance techniques such as orchestration and deference to work towards mutual complementarity between
layered international institutions. Inter-institutional complementarity needs to be deliberately created by decision-makers
that work to coordinate the governance efforts of separately established international institutions.
• Within the regime complex for international trade, decision-makers should work towards balancing the desire to enable
high levels of economic interdependence with the recognition that economic and political models around the world are
highly diverse.
• Decision-makers working on ‘mega-regional’ trade agreements should work towards maximizing the complementarity of
the rules those agreements establish with existing WTO rules.
How the rise of preferential trading agreements
transforms global trade governance
With 272 of the 302 preferential trading agreements (PTAs)
currently in force adopted after 1995 (Baccini, 2019), the
proliferation of PTAs is described as ‘the main change to the
international trading system since the mid-1990s’ (Baccini
and D€ur, 2015, p. 617).1 It has transformed global trade gov-
ernance from a centralized regime into a decentralized
regime complex. Prominent trade economists worry that the
proliferation of PTAs weakens the liberal trade order by
inducing economic fragmentation (Hoeckman and Sabel,
2019; Schwab, 2011). Jagdish Bhagwati (2008, xii) vividly
summarized these worries in describing PTAs as ‘termites
(. . .) eating away at the multilateral system relentlessly and
progressively’. Other trade economists, by contrast, see PTAs
as stepping stones for multilateral liberalization (Cottier
et al., 2015; Panagariya, 1999).
Not only PTAs, but international institutions in general
have proliferated over the past decades (Pevehouse et al.,
2019). The debate about the consequences of PTAs for glo-
bal trade governance among trade economists therefore
mirrors a broader debate among scholars of international
institutions who inquire into whether the proliferation of
international institutions enhances or impedes inter-state
cooperation (Alter and Raustiala, 2018; Faude and Gehring,
2017; Orsini et al., 2013). Two arguments contend within this
debate. One holds that institutional proliferation gradually
weakens international commitments and undermines the
effectiveness of global governance arrangements by letting
states pursue their parochial interests through forum-shop-
ping (Benvenisti and Downs, 2007; Drezner, 2013; Hale et al.,
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2013b). Institutional proliferation is conceived of as ‘dysfunc-
tional fragmentation, reducing the ability of multilateral
institutions to provide public goods’ (Hale et al., 2013b, p.
228). From this perspective, regime complexes ‘impede
effective cooperation instead of facilitating it’ (Hale et al.,
2013a, p. 16). A second perspective emphasizes the poten-
tial of regime complexes to self-organize in the absence of
a central authority (Gehring and Faude, 2013; Kim, 2019). It
suggests that the proliferation of international institutions
gives rise to various processes of inter-institutional adapta-
tion, orchestration, and deference that states exploit to fash-
ion institutionalized cooperation resilient (Abbott et al.,
2015; Gehring and Faude, 2014; Pratt, 2018). Authors sub-
scribing to this line of reasoning emphasize that regime
complexes do ‘not necessarily imply chaos, anarchy, or dis-
order’ but may feature ‘structural coherence’ (Kim, 2019, p.
12).
This paper connects the literature on PTAs to broader the-
oretical debates in IPE and IR. In contrast to the worries of
prominent trade economists and scholars of international
institutions, it argues that the proliferation of PTAs is part of
the path-dependent evolution of the post-Second World
War liberal trade order and enhances its resilience. This
path-dependent process has endogenously produced dis-
tributive conflicts that have increased preference hetero-
geneity among governments. By implication, it has become
increasingly more difficult for states to come to agreement
on multilateral cooperative solutions. As a result, ‘legislative
gridlock’ characterizes the WTO today (Collier, 2006; Narlikar,
2010a, 2010b). The proliferation of PTAs, however, increases
the ability of the liberal trade order to accommodate hetero-
geneous preferences and distributive conflicts. PTAs provide
a work-around that help overcome ‘legislative gridlock’ in
the WTO by allowing groups of states with comparatively
homogenous preferences to pursue cooperative projects
that go beyond what is acceptable to the entire member-
ship. They enable states to forge cooperative arrangement
without reforming the WTO by adding a layer of new rules.
In doing so, PTAs enhance the resilience of the liberal trade
order, understood as its adaptability to a changing environ-
ment.2 In short, the proliferating PTAs enable the continua-
tion of a path of progressive liberalization that originated
with the creation of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT). The broader implication for global policy is
that institutional proliferation offers a way to move beyond
gridlock as long as the resulting regime complexes feature
inter-institutional coordination (cf. Hale et al., 2013b).
This theoretical contribution complements the rich and
detailed empirical literature on the proliferation of PTAs
(Baccini, 2019; D€ur et al., 2014; D€ur and Elsig, 2015). This lit-
erature found that PTAs are carefully adapted to work with
and to expand multilateral WTO rules (Allee et al., 2017; Kim
and Manger, 2017). At the same time, it has yet to put these
findings in a larger theoretical context. As Morin and
Gomez-Mera (2019) observe, little theoretical attention has
been paid on how the interactions between the WTO and
PTAs affect the evolution of the liberal trade order. As a
result, they encourage trade analysts to ‘take the temporal
dimension more seriously when it comes to studying trade
institutions’ (Morin and Gomez-Mera, 2019, p. 20). Taking up
this plea, the present paper develops a historical institution-
alist argument which captures the systemic implications of
the spreading PTAs for the liberal trade order. In doing so, it
provides a theoretical lens to contextualize and explain the
empirical findings.
The paper proceeds in four sections. The next section
develops a historical institutionalist approach to the study of
continuous change in the liberal trade order. Section 3 ana-
lyzes the dynamic development of the liberal trade order
and the reasons behind its gradual shift from a centralized
regime to a decentralized regime complex. Section 4 details
how a gradual process of change has served to enhance the
resilience of the liberal trade order. The concluding section
discusses the implications of the paper for the debate about
the future of international trade system and global gover-
nance at large.
Explaining the resilience of the liberal trade order
A historical institutionalist approach provides the analytical
tools to explain why its path-dependent development has
led the international trade system to become more decen-
tralized with time and why this process has enhanced its
resilience. It suggests that the adoption of the GATT in 1947
has triggered an endogenous process of ‘self-reinforcing
interdependence’ (Hale et al., 2013b, p. 224). Within this pro-
cess, increasing levels of transnational interdependence
have given rise to growing levels of institutionalization
which, in turn, have set in motion even higher levels of
transnational interdependence.
The process of ‘self-reinforcing interdependence’ is driven
by two micro-level mechanisms that feature extensively in
historical institutional accounts of institutional change: in-
creasing returns and network effects. Increasing returns refer
to ‘a steady increase in returns relative to once-feasible
alternatives’ for actors that profit from an existing structure
(Fioretos, 2011, p. 377; Pierson, 2000). This micro-level mech-
anism captures a process in which ‘the more a choice is
made or an action is taken, the greater the benefit’ for the
stakeholders (Page, 2006, p. 88). Thus, increasing returns
imply that ‘preceding steps in a particular direction induce
further movement in the same direction’ (Pierson, 2000, p.
252). A historical institutionalist perspective therefore sug-
gests that increasing returns drive the expansion of GATT’s
regulatory scope since stakeholders have come to recognize
that further benefits may be reaped by removing remaining
barriers to trade. More precisely, it conjectures that success-
ful liberalization through the GATT framework makes export-
oriented sectors increasingly aware that a further reduction
of trade barriers entails additional benefits, including more
returns from greater specialization and reductions in trans-
action costs (Bailey et al., 1997). In short, liberalization cre-
ates ‘demands for further liberalization’ (Barton et al., 2006,
p. 16). By strengthening the export-oriented parts of econo-
mies, fueling growth in multinational firms and transnational
supply chains, and by stimulating investments in
© 2020 The Authors. Global Policy published by Durham University and John Wiley & Sons Ltd. Global Policy (2020)
Benjamin Faude2
technologies that facilitate cross-border production, increas-
ing returns alter the political landscape by empowering
export-oriented sectors and weaken protectionist forces
(Baldwin, 2006).
Network effects are present when the marginal utility of
joining a group increases with the total number of partici-
pating actors (North, 1990; Pierson, 2000). Since export-ori-
ented sectors in member countries can reap greater benefits
from the liberal trade order as the number of member
states grows, a historical institutionalist account suggests
that network effects drive the increasing membership of
GATT/WTO. An increasing membership means larger interna-
tional markets, which in turn strengthen the prospects for
export-oriented sectors to take advantage of the liberal
trade order.
However, while individual member-states enjoy increasing
returns from membership in a club, expanding membership
and regulatory scope also increase the prospect that prefer-
ence heterogeneity will grow among members. Domestic
regulatory systems are diverse and domestic groups differ-
entially affected. Thus, governments vary greatly with
respect to their preferred international rules on ‘behind-the-
border issues’ (Farrell and Newman, 2010). The harmoniza-
tion of domestic regulatory systems entails sunk costs that
make it more difficult with time to transform governance
structures.
Inherent in the logic of ‘self-reinforcing interdependence’
is a gradual shift in rule-making from ‘at-the-border issues’
to ‘behind-the-border issues’, or from abolishing tariffs (‘neg-
ative integration’) to making domestic regulatory systems
compatible with each other (‘positive integration’) (Hoeck-
man, 2014). Since this shift has introduced greater prefer-
ence heterogeneity, the distributional consequences of trade
liberalization have grown over time (Elsig, 2015). Thus, while
network effects create preference homogeneity in the sense
that members and non-members alike have an incentive to
increase the size of the market, the expansion of the regula-
tory scope to ‘behind-the-border issues’ introduces prefer-
ence heterogeneity with regard to the content of the rules
governing international markets (Farrell and Newman, 2010).
The expansion of the liberal trade order to include more
diverse economies with different levels of development,
state-market relationships, and regulatory systems, also con-
tributes to enhanced levels of preference heterogeneity
among states.
In sum, the shift from ‘at-the-border issues’ to ‘behind-
the-border issues’ makes a continuation of the path of pro-
gressive liberalization within the WTO system more difficult
(Collier, 2006; Narlikar, 2010a, 2010b). PTAs have therefore
emerged as a way of mitigating, or working around, the
problems of preference heterogeneity within the WTO sys-
tem. A historical institutionalist perspective suggests that
they represent a sort of layering in which difficulties in
reforming existing structures induces members to add new
institutions to the existing ones. Layering ‘does not intro-
duce wholly new institutions or rules, but rather involves
amendments, revisions, or additions to existing ones’ (Maho-
ney and Thelen, 2010, p. 16). It is a common strategy by
actors that are interested in institutional change, but face
‘legislative gridlock’ (Thelen, 2003).
Layering takes place when dissatisfied actors lack the
capacity to change a focal institution and to explicitly set up
an alternative institutional framework. It takes advantage of
the fact that those who prevent changes to an existing insti-
tution lack the capacity to prevent the creation of new rules
outside of it (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010, p. 17). Actors that
layer new rules on top of a focal institution ‘accommodate
and in many ways adapt to the logic of the preexisting sys-
tem’ (Thelen, 2003, p. 226). Layering thus enables dissatis-
fied states to work around the institutional status quo by
adding new rules, rather than by dismantling the GATT/WTO
system. It is used by actors who ‘work within the existing
system by adding new rules on top of or alongside old
ones’ (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010, p. 17). Layering is ‘politi-
cally attractive’ because it ‘reduces opposition by those who
would confront larger losses if major reforms were imple-
mented instead’ (Fioretos, 2011, pp. 389–390). It implies that
PTAs are conditioned by the prevailing WTO rules, because
‘[a]ctors that enjoy positive returns from extant designs tend
to incorporate new institutions and policies in ways that are
compatible with the existing structure so as not to disturb
the functioning of institutions that are the source of tangi-
ble benefits’ (Fioretos, 2011, p. 378). Layering therefore sus-
tains the path-dependent process of progressive
liberalization that started with the conclusion of the GATT in
1947 and that follows the logic of ‘self-reinforcing interde-
pendence’.
This historical institutionalist account of the dynamic
development of the post-Second World War liberal trade
order features an important similarity with the ‘gridlock the-
sis’ (Hale et al., 2013b). It subscribes to the notion that ‘self-
reinforcing interdependence’ has produced ‘second-order
cooperation problems’ which are difficult to resolve within
the WTO. More importantly, however, it diverges from the
conclusion that the governance of global trade is gridlocked.
For Thomas Hale and his co-authors, the fact that the GATT/
WTO system is not able to solve ‘second-order cooperation
problems’ implies a complete breakdown of cooperation in
this issue-area (Hale et al., 2013a, pp. 154–162). The present
paper, by contrast, suggests that, by layering new rules on
top of the multilateral GATT/WTO system, states have
enabled the continuation of the liberalization path, the grid-
locked WTO notwithstanding. In other words, states have
successfully worked around the gridlocked WTO by estab-
lishing a plethora of PTAs.
Thus, rather than leading global trade governance to grid-
lock, ‘self-reinforcing interdependence’ has led to a transfor-
mation of global trade governance from a centralized
regime to a decentralized regime complex (cf. Hale et al.,
2013b). Since this process of institutional change enables
the continuation of the path of progressive liberalization
within a more decentralized institutional structure, path-de-
pendent layering through PTAs enhances the resilience of
the liberal trade order. Institutional change on the meso-
level has brought the institutional underpinnings of the lib-
eral trade order in line with changing social, political and
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economic conditions. In doing so, it has facilitated resilience
on the macro-level (cf. Thelen, 2003, p. 211).
Given the large number of institutions regulating interna-
tional trade, this issue-area is a rich field for researching
regime complexes (Davis, 2009, p. 29). Thus, the historical
institutionalist line of reasoning developed in this paper
may well be transferable to other issue-areas. In one of his
seminal contributions to historical-institutionalist scholarship,
Paul Pierson (2004, p. 27) holds that ‘[p]ath dependent pro-
cesses will often be most powerful not at the level of indi-
vidual organizations but at a more macro level that involves
complementary configurations of organizations and institu-
tions’. It is therefore not surprising that, in their seminal arti-
cle on regime complexes, Raustiala and Victor (2004) draw
on path dependence to account for the emergence of the
regime complex for plant genetic resources. More precisely,
they argue that ‘the array of rules already in force channel
and constrain the content of new elemental regimes’ (Raus-
tiala and Victor, 2004, p. 280). On a general level, Raustiala
and Victor hold that regime complexes ‘evolve against a
thick backdrop of existing rules’ and are thus subject to dis-
tinctive dynamics (Raustiala and Victor, 2004, p. 306). Sur-
prisingly, however, this paper presents the first systematic
attempt to develop a path-dependent account of how a
centralized regime transformed into a decentralized regime
complex.
From Geneva to Doha: towards a regime complex
for international trade
On 30 October 1947, 23 contracting parties signed the GATT
as a temporary measure. Because of the failure to establish
the International Trade Organization (ITO), the ‘temporary’
GATT initiative emerged as the only piece of a formal inter-
national agreement around which trade relations could be
organized.
Compared to the failed ITO, the GATT incorporated a
smaller and more coherent set of countries and concen-
trated on a narrow and comparatively uncontroversial part
of global trade governance, namely reductions on tariffs in
manufactured goods. The core goal of the GATT was to put
in place a non-discriminatory trading system that departed
from the pre-Second World War system of discriminatory
trading blocs. However, the turn away from preferential lib-
eralization remained incomplete. Article XXIV of the GATT
facilitates the continuation of preferential trade systems as
long as three conditions are fulfilled: first, PTAs need to
cover substantially all trade; second, they need to abolish
duties and other regulations on internal trade between
members; third, they are not allowed to raise the general
incidence of duties against third countries. The intention
behind Article XXIV was to regulate deviations from GATT’s
‘cornerstone’ of non-discrimination through preferential lib-
eralization.
The question of how to design Article XXIV figured
among the most contentious issues in the discussions on
the post- Second World War liberal trade order (Irwin et al.,
2008). It represents a compromise between the pure non-
discriminatory approach promoted by the US and the British
position more in favor of preferential liberalization to pre-
serve the system of imperial preferences put in place at the
Ottawa Imperial Economic Conference in 1932 (Winters,
2017). This compromise constrained and channelled the
evolution of the liberal trade order in the decades that fol-
lowed. From a historical institutionalist perspective, it set the
stage for a path-dependent process which induced multilat-
eral liberalization within the GATT/WTO system and prefer-
ential liberalization through the addition of PTAs.
Between 1947 and 1995, the membership and the regula-
tory scope of the multilateral trading system expanded sig-
nificantly. By the late 1960s, the number of ‘contracting
parties’ had tripled, and by the early 1970s it had quadru-
pled (Jupille et al., 2013). A large part of the new ‘contract-
ing parties’ was (newly independent) developing countries
from South Asia, Latin America and Africa (Finlayson and
Zacher, 1981). From the mid-1960s onward, developing
countries represented over 70% of the GATT states (Jupille
et al., 2013).
GATT’s regulatory scope also expanded over time. The
first six negotiation rounds between 1947 and 1967 were
used to significantly reduce the level of tariff barriers to
trade. At the end of the Kennedy Round, tariff barriers were
at ‘historical lows’ (Goldstein and Gulotty, 2017, p. 205). The
Kennedy Round is therefore seen as the turning point from
‘negative integration’ to ‘positive integration’. Since ‘positive
integration’ generated adaptation costs on the domestic
level, this turning point exposed the distributional conse-
quences of global trade governance (Elsig, 2015, pp. 74–76).
The Uruguay Round (1986–1994) further expanded mem-
bership to 123 countries and accelerated the shift from tar-
iffs to non-tariff barriers to trade. In parallel, however, PTAs
started to layer new rules on top of GATT rules. After the US
adopted PTAs with Israel, Canada and Mexico during the
1980s, their proliferation increased in the early 1990s in
reaction to the European Single Market Programme (1992)
and accelerated to unprecedented levels after 1994 (Baccini,
2019; D€ur and Elsig, 2015).
The failure to launch a new round of trade negotiations
at the Ministerial Conference 1999 in Seattle demonstrated
for the first time the difficulty of coming to agreement
within the newly established WTO. In 2001, the first round
of multilateral trade negotiations organized by the WTO –
the so-called Doha Development Round – began and
included 142 countries. It eventually grew to a membership
of 164 countries.3 A decade later it became apparent that
the Doha round was at an impasse. WTO members declined
to reaffirm the Doha mandate in December 2015 at the Min-
isterial Conference in Nairobi in reaction to a controversy
surrounding India’s domestic food security programme. At
the December 2017 Ministerial Conference, it was the first
time in over a dozen years that participants failed to pro-
duce a joint declaration.
As the historical institutionalist account suggests, the grid-
lock in the Doha Development Round is caused not by tech-
nical, but by political differences (Hufbauer and Cimino,
2013). It reflects the difficulty of reaching an agreement on
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a large number of topics among a large number of states
with heterogeneous preferences. The current gridlock in the
WTO is therefore inherent in the path-dependent logic of
‘self-reinforcing interdependence’. The global membership
of the WTO implies that it accommodates not only the
established trading powers from the ‘Global North’, but also
rising economies from the ‘Global South’. To reflect the glo-
bal shift in economic power, Brazil and India replaced
Canada and Japan at the core decision-making forum of the
WTO negotiations, the Quad. Having Brazil and India at the
heart of decision-making represents a very different arrange-
ment than one that features Canada and Japan (Narlikar,
2010a, 2010b). Among other things, it represents a stronger
contrast between ‘statist models of capitalist development’
in the former countries and the ‘liberal capitalist models’
prevalent in the latter (Stephen, 2014). It also raises the pro-
spects of continued differences over how to break an
impasse in global trade liberalization within the WTO.
Topics negotiated during the Doha Round such as compe-
tition and investment policies, public procurement and trade
facilitation, as well as labor standards are all ‘deep trade
issues’ that create significant adjustment costs within
national economies. Such costs vary across economic sec-
tors. By implication, they give rise to distributional conflicts
within and across states. As a result, agreements on ambi-
tious agendas of trade liberalization become more difficult
(Kahler, 2013). Put differently, regulatory rule-making
becomes feasible only among those WTO members that are
able to agree on common rules without creating pro-
hibitively high adaptation costs within their domestic soci-
eties. Thus, only sub-sets of the WTO membership with
relatively homogenous preferences are able to agree on reg-
ulatory rules. As a result, regulatory rule-making is possible
only within PTAs (Hoeckman and Mavroidis, 2015). One fol-
low-on consequence has been that rule-making in interna-
tional trade matters has shifted from the global to the
regional and to the bilateral levels (Elsig et al., 2017). The
governance gaps that emerged as a result of the gridlock in
the Doha Development Round are being closed by PTAs,
albeit incompletely (Kim et al., 2016).4 In sum, the layering
of PTAs on top of those rules that are institutionalized in
the WTO is endogenous to the path-dependent develop-
ment of global trade governance, as suggested by the his-
torical institutionalist account.
The gradual filling of gaps in global trade governance led
multilateral companies involved in global supply chains to
have greater interest in regulatory rules for the global econ-
omy. These were thought to reduce non-tariff barriers to
trade and allow multinational companies to reap higher
benefits by exploiting the advantages that different produc-
tion locations offer. Within the WTO, however, their demand
for regulatory rules could not be met. Preference hetero-
geneity among members was great (see Baccini and D€ur,
2015; Kim et al., 2016), and states therefore responded by
increasingly adopting PTAs to meet the demands for regula-
tory rule-making among multinational companies (Hoeck-
man and Mavroidis, 2015). Richard Baldwin (2016, p. 95)
succinctly summarizes this development when noting that
‘WTO members have massively lowered barriers to trade,
investment, and services bilaterally, regionally, and unilater-
ally – indeed, everywhere except through the WTO’. In other
words, ‘[m]uch of the trade liberalization that we have seen
in the past 20 years is preferential rather than unilateral or
multilateral’ (Baccini, 2019, p. 2). As a result, it is incomplete
to conceive of global trade governance as gridlocked (cf.
Hale et al., 2013 a, 2013b).
The proliferation of PTAs has the potential to affect the
fundamentals of the liberal trade order. Since PTAs discrimi-
nate between insiders and outsiders, they are seen by some
authors as institutional competitors to the WTO which
‘might further weaken prospects in the longer term for mul-
tilateral trade cooperation’ (Hale et al., 2013a, p. 161) and
cause a ‘fracturing of global trade into competing blocs’
(Bown, 2017, p. 107; see also Winters, 2017). Trade econo-
mists worry that the proliferating PTAs lead to economic
fragmentation and, by implication, to a slowing growth of
global trade (Kim et al., 2016). There is, however, no empiri-
cal evidence that such an effect has occurred (Baldwin,
2016; Elsig et al., 2017). To the contrary, empirical research
finds that ‘average levels of protection have continued to
fall throughout the post-1995 period’ (Elsig et al., 2017, p.
22) and that PTAs had a positive impact on trade flows (D€ur
et al., 2014). These developments reflect the strong and
widespread ‘presence’ of the WTO in PTAs (Allee et al., 2017,
see also Kim and Manger, 2017).
PTAs refer to the WTO in their key provisions (Elsig et al.,
2017). Their adjustment to existing WTO rules allows states
to realize ‘greater openness’ than is achievable in ‘WTO
negotiations which are conducted by a large number of
states with heterogeneous interests’ (Mansfield and Milner,
2015). The GATT/WTO system, however, has paved the way
to ‘deeper integration’ initiatives that are easier to pursue
through PTAs and therefore remains relevant despite the
proliferating PTAs (Hoeckman and Mavroidis, 2015). Through
their proliferation, PTAs have transformed global trade gov-
ernance from a centralized regime into a decentralized
regime complex. As the next section details, PTAs comple-
ment rather than undermine the GATT/WTO system. By
enhancing the ability of the liberal trade order to accommo-
date heterogeneous preferences and distributive conflicts,
they enhance its resilience.
Layering and resilience in the liberal trade order
The preceding section has demonstrated that contemporary
global trade governance is dominated by two related phe-
nomena: gridlock in rule-making at the WTO level and the
accelerated proliferation of PTAs. Indeed, PTAs ‘have domi-
nated the international trade regulation landscape for the
past 15 years’ and became the ‘most prominent and impor-
tant governance instrument of our times for regulating trade
and investment flows’ (D€ur and Elsig, 2015, pp. 1, 19). Practi-
tioners and scholars worry that the proliferation of PTAs sig-
nals a weakening of the liberal trade order and foreshadows
a return to a more fragmented trading system (Bhagwati,
2013; Winters, 2017; WTO, 2011).
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The worries of trade economists rely on the ‘building
blocks or stumbling blocks’ approach to the effects of PTAs
for the liberal trade order (see Panagariya, 1999; Winters,
2017). This approach rests on two assumptions: first, PTAs
are exclusively about preferential tariffs; second, there is a
trade-off between preferential and multilateral tariff liberal-
ization. These assumptions do not apply to the PTAs that
have been established after the creation of the WTO. As the
preceding section has established, contemporary PTAs are
primarily about ‘rule writing’, not about ‘tariff cutting’. Their
rules focus on ‘behind-the-border’ or ‘deep trade issues’ and
build upon the rules agreed upon within the GATT/WTO sys-
tem (Baldwin, 2011; Kim et al., 2016).
As the historical institutionalist account suggests, the pro-
liferation of PTAs represents a process of institutional adap-
tation to the internationalization of production processes
the GATT/WTO system has enabled since 1947 (WTO, 2011).
Since the expansion of its regulatory scope allowed firms to
differentiate their production processes, intra-industry trade
in intermediate products constitutes a significant part of
contemporary world trade (see Hoeckman, 2014). By formu-
lating rules that ‘address regulatory causes of market seg-
mentation’ and ‘reduce the cost-raising effects of domestic
politics’ (Hoeckman, 2014), contemporary PTAs reinforce
existing ‘global production networks’ and the trade flows
they generate (Kim et al., 2016, p. 331). Substantively, they
go beyond what has been and can be agreed upon within
the WTO (see Allee et al., 2017; Kim et al., 2016). The prolif-
erating PTAs therefore reflect that more complex forms of
economic exchange require deeper agreements (Baldwin,
2011, pp. 4–5). Since the preferences within its global mem-
bership are heterogeneous and the distributive conflicts
numerous, deep agreements are politically not feasible
within the WTO.
The institutional development towards a regime complex
for international trade follows a path-dependent logic. That
is, WTO rules constrain and channel the rules that are
adopted within the proliferating PTAs (Allee et al., 2017; Kim
and Manger, 2017). Actors design PTAs in ways that are
compatible with the WTO to be able to reap the benefits
from both multilateral and preferential liberalization. This
process of inter-institutional adaptation ensures that the
PTAs do not undermine the multilateral process of liberaliza-
tion that economic actors are profiting from. It results in a
‘loose coupling’ between the WTO and the proliferating
PTAs that ultimately contributes to making the liberal trade
order resilient.
Inter-institutional adaptation between the WTO and the
PTAs is visible, first, in the explicit references that contempo-
rary PTAs make to WTO commitments, and, second, in the
direct incorporation of language from WTO agreements. The
average PTA makes roughly 25 references to WTO-related
rules and most sub-chapters in nearly all contemporary PTAs
invoke WTO agreements (Allee et al., 2017). These references
not only signify ‘compatibility and consistency with the
WTO’ (Allee et al., 2017, p. 335), they even make sure that
the regulatory rules institutionalized within PTAs ‘reinforce
and further strengthen rules embodied within existing WTO
agreements’ (Kim et al., 2016, p. 331). This means that pref-
erential and multilateral liberalization are not two distinct
avenues to regulate international trade, but have become
deeply intertwined (Cottier et al., 2015). In other words, the
adaptation of PTAs to the WTO guarantees that preferential
liberalization does not turn global trade governance into
exclusive economic blocs, but into a loosely coupled regime
complex that accommodates diverse, but mutually comple-
mentary institutions for managing international trade.
As the historical institutionalist account expects, the layer-
ing of PTAs on top of the GATT/WTO system gives rise to an
‘interdependent web of an institutional matrix’ (North, 1990,
p. 95). By increasing its ability to accommodate preference
heterogeneity and distributive conflicts, this web produces
‘institutional network effects’ that enhance the resilience of
the liberal trade order (cf. Z€urn, 2016, p. 207). To preserve
inter-institutional adaptation may, however, be a costly pro-
cess (Abbott et al., 2015; Pratt, 2018). Within this institutional
arrangement, PTAs continue the path of progressive liberal-
ization set in motion by the GATT in 1947. They enable
cooperative solutions to distributional conflicts by reducing
the heterogeneity of preferences. In doing so, PTAs counter
the drift of the WTO which, because of legislative gridlock,
is not capable of continuing the path of progressive liberal-
ization. Given the preference heterogeneity in the member-
ship and the distributional conflicts attached to regulatory
rule-making within the WTO system, progressive liberaliza-
tion through encompassing multilateral treaties adminis-
tered by the WTO is politically not feasible.
At the same time, for three reasons, the development
towards a decentralized regime complex for international
trade is only the second-best solution for continuing the
path of progressive liberalization. First, it weakens the WTO’s
cornerstone principle of non-discrimination. Second, com-
pared to an encompassing multilateral treaty system admin-
istered by the WTO, PTAs increase the transaction cost of
international trade for all actors involved. Third, effective
global trade governance through a decentralized regime
complex presupposes continuous inter-institutional adapta-
tion and coordination among the GATT/WTO pillar and the
proliferating PTAs in order to prevent the PTAs from under-
mining the WTO and inducing economic fragmentation.
The proliferation of PTAs shifts governance authority away
from the WTO. However, the shift of governance authority
to PTAs varies strongly across governance functions. Legisla-
tive gridlock within the WTO implies a strong shift of rule-
making authority from the WTO to PTAs. At the same time,
the WTO continues to competently monitor the trade poli-
cies of its members and to offer technical assistance and
capacity building (Elsig et al., 2017; Karlas and Parizek,
2019). With regard to rule enforcement through dispute set-
tlement, the situation is more ambiguous. Since the US is
blocking all nominees to the panel, the WTO Appellate Body
is paralyzed at the moment. With currently only one active
member remaining, the Appellate Body is not operable and
it remains to be seen whether it can be restored. In another
instance of layering, the EU and 16 other WTO members
have therefore decided earlier this year to work around the
© 2020 The Authors. Global Policy published by Durham University and John Wiley & Sons Ltd. Global Policy (2020)
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paralyzed Appellate Body by using another appeals and
arbitration system according to Article 25 of the WTO Dis-
pute Settlement Understanding.5 In sum, the shift of gover-
nance authority away from the WTO is weaker in regards to
the monitoring and enforcement of trade rules. The prolifer-
ating PTAs therefore displace the WTO only partially.
All in all, the proliferation of PTAs enhances the resilience
of the liberal trade order. It facilitates the adaptation of glo-
bal trade governance to a higher level of preference hetero-
geneity and an increased number of distributive conflicts.
Heterogeneous preferences and distributive conflicts imply
that the demand for regulatory rule-making, created by the
path-dependent development of global trade governance
since the end of the Second World War, could not be met
in the absence of PTAs. Because the commitments states
enter into through PTAs are adjusted to their WTO commit-
ments, they do not fragment the global economy.
An alternative scenario in which PTAs contradict WTO
rules and thereby fragment the global economy, as feared
by prominent trade economists, is not supported empirically
(Bhagwati, 2008; Winters, 2017). The adaption of PTAs to the
WTO also contrasts with Daniel Drezner’s (2013) claim that
the proliferation of PTAs should have led to the erosion of
regulatory coherence in global trade governance and, thus,
to the undermining of the mechanisms that foster trade lib-
eralization and institutionalized cooperation. According to
Drezner, states should have used the forum-shopping
opportunities they gain through the proliferation of PTAs
and subsequently defect from WTO rules (Drezner, 2013).
From this perspective, the institutional proliferation in global
trade governance should have led to the gradual undermin-
ing of the liberal trade order and the return of power-based
trade. However, this trend is not observed empirically.
Instead, states have sought to maintain the WTO, while sign-
ing a growing number of PTA to promote trade liberaliza-
tion. This pattern is consistent with historical institutionalist
accounts of institutional development which stress the role
that increasing returns to institutions play in strengthening
established institutions and the role network effects play in
enhancing commitments to incremental adjustments to
existing rules. Taken together, they combine to create a resi-
lient international trade system. Despite the gridlocked
WTO, it is therefore not accurate to describe global trade
governance altogether as gridlocked (cf. Hale et al., 2013).
States have managed to work around the gridlocked WTO
through layering PTAs on top of the WTO rules and thereby
fashioned the liberal trade order resilient.
Conclusions
This paper connects the empirical literature on the prolifer-
ating PTAs with broader theoretical debates in IPE and IR. It
integrates the accelerated proliferation of PTAs in recent
decades into an overarching institutional path that started
with the adoption of the GATT in 1947. The paper thereby
avoids seeing proximate factors (such as gridlock in the
Doha Development Round) as the source of the proliferation
of PTAs which is, in fact, caused by longer-term
developments (heightened levels of preference heterogene-
ity and distributive conflicts). It shows that the development
from a centralized regime towards a decentralized regime
complex is part of the path-dependent evolution of the
post-Second World War liberal trade order which is driven
by the logic of ‘self-reinforcing interdependence’ (Hale et al.,
2013b). The paper explains how, for insiders and outsiders
alike, the liberal trade order became more attractive, how its
increasing attractiveness rendered the institutional underpin-
ning of the order more complex, and how the layering of
new rules on top of those existing within the GATT/WTO
system enhanced the resilience of the order by increasing
its ability to accommodate heterogeneous preferences and
distributional conflicts. Contrary to the worries of prominent
trade economists and institutionalist scholars of international
relations, the proliferation of PTAs neither reflects nor brings
about the weakening or collapse of the liberal trade order. It
rather constitutes a process of inter-institutional adaptation
to changing social, political and economic conditions which
results in a regime complex for international trade consist-
ing of mutually complementary parts.
The argument put forward in this paper has direct impli-
cations for the current debate about the consequences of
the ongoing trade conflicts for the WTO and the interna-
tional trade system. It implies that, because of diverging
economic and political models, the preference heterogeneity
between the US and China may be too great to allow for
deep regulatory cooperation between the two states and,
consequentially, on the global level (Rodrik et al., 2019).
More generally, the preference heterogeneity among the
164 WTO members may make any encompassing agree-
ment that is acceptable to all of them highly unlikely. Actors
should therefore work to further increase the ability of the
international trade system to accommodate members with
diverse economic and political systems (cf. Keohane and Vic-
tor, 2011 on global climate governance).
In recent years, major economies around the world have
shifted their efforts to put in place deep regulatory rules from
the global level to ‘mega-regional’ agreements with like-
minded partners. To be sure, in some cases, it turned out to
be difficult to generate sufficient societal and political support
for regulatory cooperation through ‘mega-regionals’ due to
high levels of preference heterogeneity and distributive con-
flicts. However, the ‘mega-regional’ approach is in line with
the argument put forward in this article, because ‘mega-re-
gionals’ essentially aim at further increasing the ability of the
system to accommodate heterogeneous preferences and dis-
tributional conflicts against the backdrop of a gridlocked
WTO. They are therefore part of the transformation of the
institutional underpinnings of the liberal trade order from a
centralized regime to a decentralized regime complex.
Importantly, the argument put forward in this article
implies that neither the ongoing trade disputes between
major economies nor the shift to ‘mega-regionals’ are likely
to undermine the liberal trade order. Rather, it suggests that
the logic of ‘self-reinforcing interdependence’ has created
vested interests in the liberal trade order which make a sig-
nificant reduction of economic interdependence or even a
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‘decoupling’ of major economies politically unsustainable,
the current backlash against globalization notwithstanding.
The challenge for decision-makers is therefore to continue
building a regime complex for international trade which bal-
ances the desire to enable high levels of economic interde-
pendence with the recognition that economic and political
models around the world are highly diverse.
This paper suggests that regime complexes are suitable
institutional vehicles for governing the globe in the 21st
century. They are more adept at absorbing changes in state
preferences than are strong multilateral organizations where
preference heterogeneity is a liability. Regime complexes
therefore increase the flexibility of global governance by
facilitating institutional change in the absence of consensus
within major institutions. They make it easier for states to
coordinate international action when these have diverse
preferences than systems that rely exclusively on strong
multilateral organizations. Thus, regime complexes hold the
potential to facilitate the reorganization of other parts of
global governance which are equally characterized by
increased preference heterogeneity among states. In other
words, regime complexes offer a general pathway to over-
come gridlock in major international institutions.
The key task for practitioners is to invoke suitable gover-
nance techniques such as orchestration and deference to
work towards mutual complementarity between interna-
tional (economic) institutions (Abbott et al., 2015; Pratt,
2018). Notwithstanding their potential to make institutional-
ized cooperation among states resilient in the face of chal-
lenges, regime complexes are in the first instance
characterized by overlapping claims to authority that are
not necessarily mutually complementary. Thus, the risk that
states engage in uncoordinated and potentially incompati-
ble joint action in different institutions is inherent in any
regime complex. Inter-institutional complementarity there-
fore needs to be deliberately established by decision-makers
that work to coordinate the governance efforts of separately
established international institutions. Only if inter-institu-
tional coordination is successfully established, are regime
complexes able to stabilize institutionalized cooperation in a
changing world. The present paper demonstrates that inter-
institutional complementarity has been achieved in the
regime complex for international trade. Whether this is the
case also in other parts of global (economic) governance is
an empirical question that future research should explore.
Notes
Considerable parts of this research have been carried out at the WZB
Berlin Social Science Center. I thank the WZB and the director of its glo-
bal governance unit, Michael Z€urn, for their support. Previous versions
of this paper were presented at several workshops and conferences. For
helpful comments, I am particularly indebted to Kenneth W. Abbott,
Tobias Berger, Eugenia da Conceicao-Heldt, Alejandro Esguerra, Orfeo
Fioretos, Nicole Helmerich, Anne Koch, Michal Parizek, Matthew Ste-
phen, Alexandros Tokhi and Bernhard Zangl.
1. PTAs are defined as agreements that liberalize trade between two or
more countries but do not extend this liberalization to all countries.
2. The concept of resilience has originally been used by biologists to
study the ability of populations or species to survive in the face of
adversity and by psychologists to study the ability of people to cope
with stressful situations. More recently, political scientists have used
the concept to study various governance systems (Folke, 2006).
3. Since the beginning of the Uruguay Round, 70 developing countries
have joined the multilateral trading system, about half of them after
the creation of the WTO (Baldwin, 2016).
4. In 1994, 47 PTAs were in effect, in 2000 already 93, and in 2013 their
number had risen to 260 (Aggarwal and Evenett, 2013).
5. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-01-24/eu-china-15-
others-form-alliance-to-settle-trade-disputes, accessed on 26 February
2020.
References
Abbott, K. W., Genschel, P., Snidal, D. and Zangl, B. (eds.) (2015)
International Organizations as Orchestrators. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Aggarwal, V. K. and Evenett, S. (2013) ‘A Fragmenting Global Economy:
A Weakened WTO, Mega FTAs, and Murky Protectionism’, Swiss
Political Science Review, 19 (4), pp. 550–557.
Allee, T., Elsig, M. and Lugg, A. (2017) ‘The Ties between the World
Trade Organization and Preferential Trade Agreements: A Textual
Analysis’, Journal of International Economic Law, 2 (1), pp. 333–363.
Alter, K. and Raustiala, K. (2018) ‘The Rise of International Regime
Complexity’, Annual Review of Law and Social Sciences, 14 (1), pp.
329–349.
Baccini, L. (2019) ‘The Economics and Politics of Preferential Trade
Agreements’, Annual Review of Political Science, 22 (1), pp. 75–92.
Baccini, L. and D€ur, A. (2015) ‘Investment Discrimination and the
Proliferation of Preferential Trade Agreements’, Journal of Conflict
Resolution, 59 (4), pp. 617–644.
Bailey, M. A., Goldstein, J. and Weingast, B. R. (1997) ‘The Institutional
Roots of American Trade Policy. Politics, Coalitions, and International
Trade’, World Politics, 49 (3), pp. 309–338.
Baldwin, R. (2006) ‘Multilateralising Regionalism: Spaghetti Bowls as
Building Blocs on the Path to Global Free Trade’, The World Economy,
29 (11), pp. 1451–1518.
Baldwin, R. (2011) 21st century Regionalism: Filling the gap between
21st century trade and 20th century trade rules. World Trade
Organization. Economic Research and Statistics Division. Staff
Working Paper ERSD-2011-08.
Baldwin, R. (2016) ‘The World Trade Organization and the Future of
Multilateralism’, The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 30 (1), pp. 95–115.
Barton, J. H., Goldstein, J. L., Josling, T. E. and Steinberg, R. H. (2006) The
Evolution of the Trade Regime. Politics, Law, and Economics of the
GATT and the WTO. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Benvenisti, E. and Downs, G. W. (2007) ‘The Empire’s New Clothes:
Political Economy and the Fragmentation of International Law’,
Stanford Law Review, 60 (2), pp. 595–632.
Bhagwati, J. (2008) Termites in the Trading System: How Preferential
Agreements Undermine Free Trade. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Bhagwati, J. (2013) ‘Dawn of a New System’, Finance & Development,
December 2013, 50 (4), pp. 9–13.
Bown, C. P. (2017) ‘Mega-Regional Trade Agreements and the Future of
the WTO’, Global Policy, 8 (1), pp. 107–112.
Collier, P. (2006) ‘Why the WTO Is Deadlocked: And What Can Be Done
About It’, The World Economy, 29 (10), pp. 423–49.
Cottier, T., Sieber-Gasser, C. and Wermelinger, G. (2015) ‘The Dialectical
Relationship of Preferential and Multilateral Trade Agreements’, in A.
D€ur and M. Elsig (eds.), Trade Cooperation. The Purpose, Design, and
Effects of Preferential Trade Agreements. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, pp. 465–496.
Davis, C. L. (2009) ‘Overlapping Institutions in Trade Policy’, Perspectives
on Politics, 7 (1), pp. 25–31.
© 2020 The Authors. Global Policy published by Durham University and John Wiley & Sons Ltd. Global Policy (2020)
Benjamin Faude8
Drezner, D. W. (2013) ‘The Tragedy of the Global Institutional
Commons’, in M. Finnemore and J. Goldstein (eds.), Back to Basics:
State Power in the Contemporary World. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, pp. 280–310.
D€ur, A. and Elsig, M. (2015) Trade Cooperation. The Purpose, Design and
Effects of Preferential Trade Agreements. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
D€ur, A., Baccini, L. and Elsig, M. (2014) ‘The Design of International
Trade Agremments. Introducing a New Dataset’, Review of
International Organizations, 9 (3), pp. 353–375.
Elsig, M. (2015) ‘Limits to Orchestration: The Case of the World Trade
Organization’, in K. W. Abbott, P. Genschel, D. Snidal, and B. Zangl
(eds.), International Organizations as Orchestrators. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, pp. 65–87.
Elsig, M., Hoeckman, B. and Pauwelyn, J. (2017) ‘Introduction’, in M.
Elsig, B. Hoeckman and J. Pauwelyn (eds.), Assessing the World Trade
Organization. Fit for Purpose? Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
pp. 3–11.
Farrell, H. and Newman, A. L. (2010) ‘Making Global Markets: Historical
Institutionalism in International Political Economy’, Review of
International Political Economy, 17 (4), pp. 609–638.
Faude, B. and Gehring, T. (2017) ‘Regime Complexes as Governance
Systems’, in W. Sandholtz and C. A. Whytock (eds.), Research
Handbook on the Politics of International Law. Cheltenham: Edward
Elgar, pp. 176–203.
Finlayson, J. A. and Zacher, M. W. (1981) ‘The GATT and the Regulation
of Trade Barriers: Regime Dynamics and Functions’, International
Organization, 35 (4), 561–602.
Fioretos, O. (2011) ‘Historical Institutionalism in International Relations’,
International Organization, 11 (1), pp. 367–399.
Folke, C. (2006) ‘Resilience. The Emergence of a Perspective of Social-
Ecological Systems Analysis’, Global Environmental Change, 16 (3), pp.
253–267.
Gehring, T. and Faude, B. (2013) ‘The Dynamics of Regime Complexes:
Micro-foundations and Systemic Effects’, Global Governance, 19 (1),
pp. 119–130.
Gehring, T. and Faude, B. (2014) ‘A Theory of Emerging Order Within
Institutional Complexes: How Competition Among Regulatory
International Institutions Leads to Institutional Adaptation and Division
of Labor’, Review of International Organizations, 9 (4), pp. 471–498.
Goldstein, J. and Gulotty, R. (2017) ‘The Limits of Institutional Reform in
the United States and the Global Trade Regime’, in O. Fioretos (ed.),
International Politics in Time. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.
196–213.
Hale, T., Held, D. and Young, K. (2013a) Gridlock: Why Global Cooperation
is Failing When We Need It Most. Cambridge: Polity.
Hale, T., Held, D. and Young, K. (2013b) ‘Gridlock: From Self-reinforcing
Interdependence to Second-order Cooperation Problems’, Global
Policy, 4 (3), pp. 223–235.
Hoeckman, B. M. (2014) ‘Sustaining Multilateral Trade Cooperation in a
Multipolar World Economy’, Review for International Organizations, 9
(1), pp. 241–260.
Hoeckman, B. M. and Mavroidis, P. C. (2015) ‘WTO ‘a la carte’ or ‘menu
du jour’? Assessing the Case for More Plurilateral Agreements’,
European Journal of International Law, 26 (2), pp. 319–343.
Hoeckman, B. and Sabel, C. (2019) ‘Open Plurilateral Agreements,
International Regulatory Cooperation and the WTO’, Global Policy, 10
(3), pp. 297–312.
Hufbauer, G. and Cimino, C. (2013) ‘What Future for the WTO?’, The
International Trade Journal, 27 (5), pp. 394–410.
Irwin, D. A., Mavroidis, P. C. and Sykes, A. O. (2008) The Genesis of the
GATT. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Jupille, J., Snidal, D. and Mattli, W. (2013) Institutional Choice And Global
Commerce. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kahler, M. (2013) ‘Rising powers and global governance: Negotiating change
in a resilient status quo’, International Affairs, 89 (3), pp. 711–729.
Karlas, J. and Parizek, M. (2019) ‘The Process Performance of the WTO
Trade Policy Review Mechanism: Peer-reviewing Reconsidered’,
Global Policy, 10 (3), pp. 376–384.
Keohane, R. O. and Victor, D. G. (2011) ‘The Regime Complex for
Climate Change’, Perspectives on Politics, 9 (1), pp. 7–23.
Kim, R. (2019) Is Global Governance Fragmented, Polycentric, or
Complex? The State of the Art of the Network Approach’,
International Studies Review, FirstView.
Kim, S. Y. and Manger, M. S. (2017) ‘Hubs of Governance: Path-
dependence and Higher-order Effects of Preferential Trade Agreement
Formation’, Political Science Research and Methods, 5 (3), pp. 467–488.
Kim, S. Y., Mansfield, E. R. and Milner, H. V. (2016) ‘Regional Trade
Governance’, in T. A. B€orzel and T. Risse (eds.), The Oxford Handbook
of Comparative Regionalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.
323–350.
Mahoney, J. and Thelen, K. (2010) ‘A Theory of Gradual Institutional
Change’, in J. Mahoney and K. Thelen (eds.), Explaining Institutional
Change. Ambiguity, Agency, and Power. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, pp. 1–37.
Mansfield, E. D. and Milner, H. V. (2015) ‘The Political Economy of
Preferential Trade Agreements’, in A. D€urandM. Elsig (eds.), The
Purpose, Design and Effects of Preferential Trade Agreements.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 56–81.
Morin, J.-F. and Gomez-Mera, L. (2019) ‘The Evolution of Governance
Systems: The Case of the Trade Regime’, International Studies Review,
FirstView.
Narlikar, A. (2010a) ‘New Powers in the Club: The Challenges of Global
Trade Governance’, International Affairs, 86 (3), pp. 717–728.
Narlikar, A. (ed.) (2010b) Deadlocks in Multilateral Negotiations. Causes
and Solutions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
North, D. (1990) Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic
Performance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Orsini, A., Morin, J.-F. and Young, O. (2013) ‘A Buzz, a Boom, or a Boost
for Global Governance?’, Global Governance, 19 (1), pp. 27–39.
Page, S. E. (2006) ‘Path Dependence’, Quarterly Journal of Political
Science, 1 (1), pp. 87–115.
Panagariya, A. (1999) ‘The Regionalism Debate: An Overview’, The World
Economy, 22 (4), pp.455–476.
Pevehouse, J. C. W., Nordstrom, T., McMeanus, R. W. and Spencer Jamison,
A. (2019) ‘Tracking Organizations in the World: The Correlates
of War IGO Version 3.0 Datasets’, Journal of Peace Research,
002234331988117. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343319881175.
Pierson, P. (2000) ‘Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study
of Politics’, American Political Science Review, 94 (2), pp. 251–267.
Pierson, P. (2004) Politics in Time. History, Institutions, and Social Analysis.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Pratt, T. (2018) ‘Deference and Hierarchy in International Regime
Complexes’, International Organization, 72 (3), pp. 561–590.
Raustiala, K. and Victor, D. G. (2004) ‘The Regime Complex for Plant
genetic Resources’, International Organization, 58 (2), pp. 277–309.
Rodrik, Dani et al (2019) ‘US-China Trade Relations. A Way Forward’, The
US-China Trade Policy Working Group. Joint Statement. Available
from: https://www.inet.econ.cam.ac.uk/news/crowley-us-china-trade-
relations-statement-october-2019 [Accessed 18 April 2020].
Schwab, S. (2011) ‘After Doha. Why the Negotiations are Doomed and
What We Should Do About It’, Foreign Affairs, 90 (3), pp. 104–117.
Stephen, M. D. (2014) ‘Rising Powers, Global Capitalism and Liberal
Global Governance: A Historical Materialist Approach to the BRICS
Challenge’, European Journal of International Relations, 20 (4), pp.
912–938.
Thelen, K. (2003) ‘How Institutions Evolve: Insights from Comparative
Historical Analysis’, in J. Mahoney and D. Rueschmeyer (eds.),
Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, pp. 208–240.
Winters, L. A. (2017) ‘The WTO and Regional Trading Agreements. Is It
All Over for Multilateralism?’, in M. Elsig, B. Hoeckman and J.
Global Policy (2020) © 2020 The Authors. Global Policy published by Durham University and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
Breaking Gridlock 9
Pauwelyn (eds.), Assessing the World Trade Organization. Fit for
Purpose?. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 344–375.
World Trade Organization (2011) The WTO and Preferential Trade
Agreements. From Co-existence to Coherence. Geneva: World Trade
Organization.
Z€urn, M. (2016) ‘Historical Institutionalism and International Relations –
Strange Bedfellows?’, in T. Rixen, L. A. Viola and M. Z€urn (eds.),
Historical Institutionalism & International Relations. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, pp. 199–228.
Author Information
Benjamin Faude is LSE Fellow in Global Politics at the London School
of Economics and Political Science. Before coming to LSE, he was a
Senior Research Fellow at WZB Berlin. Faude held visiting positions at
the University of California at Berkeley and the Vrije Universiteit Brus-
sels. His research focuses on the implications of institutional complexity
on global governance.
© 2020 The Authors. Global Policy published by Durham University and John Wiley & Sons Ltd. Global Policy (2020)
Benjamin Faude10
